This study is designed to quantify the impact of option-based compensation on net income, diluted earnings per share (diluted EPS) and operating income for the fifty largest technology companies trading on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ. (see Appendix A for companies, industry subgroups and market caps) Specifically, it compares the net income and diluted EPS reported by each company with pro forma values, adjusted for stock option expense, as disclosed in each company's 10-K footnotes. It also estimates the impact that charging stock options as a compensation expense would have on the operating income of each company.
Introduction
This study is designed to quantify the impact of option-based compensation on net income, diluted earnings per share (diluted EPS) and operating income for the fifty largest technology companies trading on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ. (see Appendix A for companies, industry subgroups and market caps) Specifically, it compares the net income and diluted EPS reported by each company with pro forma values, adjusted for stock option expense, as disclosed in each company's 10-K footnotes. It also estimates the impact that charging stock options as a compensation expense would have on the operating income of each company.
In addition, the study segments the data based on each company's date of initial public offering. This allows us to develop an understanding of the relative differences in the use of option-based compensation between "new economy" technology firms and "old economy" technology firms.
Finally, the study seeks to provide implications for both investors and financial accounting regulators.
Acknowledgements
In August of 2000, Bear Stearns equity research published its third annual compilation of the impact of employee stock options on earnings. Their report, entitled Accounting Issues -Employee Stock Option Expense, compares reported diluted EPS to pro forma diluted EPS for the S&P 500, in aggregate and for each individual company.
The new study that follows is modeled on this Bear Stearns report. In large part, it borrows from the Bear Stearns report in terms of organization, structure and types of analysis.
However, there are a number of major differences between this study and the Bear Stearns report. First, this study looks at a different set of companies, namely the fifty largest technology firms instead of the entire S&P 500. Second and perhaps most importantly, this study bases most of its analysis on net income measures instead of diluted earnings per share measures. Diluted EPS measures are only used for purposes of comparing results with the Bear Stearns report. Finally, while similar to the Bear Stearns study in that it demonstrates implications for investors by looking at PE ratios, this study also adds a discussion of implications for financial accounting regulators.
Background on Option-based Compensation and Accounting Standards
During the past twenty-five years, option-based compensation packages have become an increasingly common form of remuneration for employees at publicly traded firms. One of the reasons for this is that they help to reduce agency costs. In other words, option-based compensation aids in the alignment of management and employee interests with those of shareholders who wish to maximize stock price.
However, while the desire to reduce agency costs has helped to spread the use of option-based compensation to all industries, it is by no means the only reason for their proliferation. In fact, the largest grantors of stock-option based compensation --technology companies --have increased their use for a complementary but somewhat separate reason.
These organizations often rely on option-based compensation for executives, as well as employees throughout the company, because they offer a cash free way to attract and retain employees. Moreover, during the dot com boom, employees were particularly excited by this form of compensation because of the significant up-side potential. Today, the number of options outstanding as a percent of outstanding stock among technology firms is more than double that of all other firms in the market (Damodaran, The Dark Side of Valuation, 2000) .
With this explosion in the use of option-based compensation, it is not surprising that great debate exists among accountants and financial officers as to the best way to represent this expense in each firm's public financial statements. Prior to 1995, the accounting standard governing the recognition of expenses pertaining to employee stock options was APB No. 25, issued in 1972. Under this guideline, the cost of compensation is measured by the excess of the quoted market price over the option strike price at the time the option was granted. Since nearly all management options are granted at the money, this standard rarely resulted in the recognition of any compensation expense for the firm.
In 1995, FAS-123 was adopted to make this expense more transparent. FAS-123 offers companies two options for incorporating this expense information into their 10-K's. First, they can choose to report the "fair value" of options grants based on an option pricing model (e.g., the Black-Scholes model) and recognize these annually as an expense.
Alternatively, companies can continue to choose the approach prescribed by APB No. 25 approach, but also report pro-forma net income and earnings per share, determined as if the fair value method of FAS-123 had been used to measure compensation cost.
While "fair value" reporting is recommended by the FASB, only two companies in the S&P 500 have adopted this technique, and neither of them is technology based (Bear Stearns Research, Accounting Issues -Employee Stock Option Expense, August 17, 2000) . The remaining firms use the guidelines set forth in APB No. 25 and also provide pro forma information in their 10-K footnotes. These footnotes are the primary source of data for this study.
Data
The companies selected for this study are the fifty largest technology firms trading on the NYSE and NASDAQ based on market capitalizations as of January 2, 2001. The net income and diluted EPS figures were garnered from the most recent 10-K for each company published prior to January 2, 2001. As such, for some companies the most recent fiscal year ended in 2000, while for others it ended in 1999. The operating income information was collected from Bloomberg. In this study, the relevant values (i.e., net income, diluted EPS, operating income) are exactly as reported in the footnotes or on Bloomberg and have not been further adjusted to include or exclude continuing operations charges, non-recurring charges, or other extraordinary charges.
Impact on Net Income, Diluted EPS
Compiled in Appendix B is the reported net income and pro forma net income adjusted for stock option expense for each of the fifty largest technology companies over the last two fiscal years. Appendix B also offers the percentage difference between the reported and pro forma net income values as well as data on the year-over-year growth of each value.
Similar to the Bear Stearns analysis, Appendix C compiles data on diluted earnings per share and pro forma diluted earnings per share.
Aggregate differences
In aggregate, net income for these 50 companies, declines by approximately 15.2% when the fair value of employee stock options is charged to earnings. In absolute terms, aggregate net income declines by more than $8.1 billion from $53.2 billion to $45.1 billion. 
Percentage decline in net income
Of the fifty companies, eleven of them exhibited pro forma net income that is more than 50% less than reported net income. For seven of them, the difference is more than 100%. That is, net income goes from positive to negative for seven of the companies. The biggest loser in percentage terms is Verisign Inc. which exhibits a difference of more than 700 percent. This significant difference between "new economy" and "old economy" technology firms is even more evident when you further segment the companies by their IPO year. This finding is not terribly surprising in the wake of the economic expansion of the 1990's and the emergence of the e-economy. Numerous technology companies have gone public in recent years without positive earnings or even positive cash flow, only the promise of positive cash flows in the future. As such, these companies have relied heavily on optionbased compensation to meet expenses and grow.
Growth in reported net income vs. pro forma net income
For the fifty largest technology firms included in this study, the year-over-year aggregate growth rate in reported net income is 41.8%. When the fair value compensation expense is charged to earning, this growth rate decreases to 33.2%. Looking at companies individually, the impact is both positive and negative. Specifically, twenty-seven companies exhibit a decrease in their year-over-year growth rates when the fair value compensation expense is charged to earnings while twelve companies exhibit an increase. Eleven companies in the data set exhibit a decrease of more than 1,000 basis points. 
Impact on Operating Income
The impact of option-based compensation on operating income for each of the fifty technology companies is provided in Appendix D. A marginal tax rate of 40% is used to estimate the pretax employee option-based compensation expense. The operating income is as reported by Bloomberg.
Aggregate operating income for these fifty companies decreases 18.3% when the fair value compensation expense is charged to operating earnings. Thirty-seven of the fifty companies experience a double-digit percentage decline in operating income. Nine companies actually shift from an operating gain to an operating loss. 
Pre-tax compensation expense
In the most recent fiscal year, seven of the fifty largest technology companies crossed the $500 million threshold for pre-tax compensation expense when the fair-value method is used. Microsoft is the leader of the group with a pro forma pre-tax compensation expense in excess of $2 billion. 
Implications for Investors
This study lends itself to a very important question. Namely, "how can investors use the pro forma information provided by each company in its 10-K footnotes to make more informed investment decisions on individual stocks?" A quick look at the data in this report suggests that net income, operating income and growth rates might not be large as they appear. Some companies that look profitable may in fact be losing money. And while the granting of stock options has no direct impact on free cash flow, the potential exercise of these options will dilute each shareholders claim on free cash flow.
Perhaps more importantly, while pure believers in the efficient market hypothesis would argue that this pro forma "information" is already completely incorporated in current stock prices, the vast majority of investors who still look to identify undervalued and overvalued equities may be able to use this information to their advantage.
Specific Example -Price Earnings Multiples
One way investors may be able to identify market inefficiencies and under-and overvalued stocks using the pro forma data is through use of a relative value measures such as the Price-Earnings (PE) multiple. Specifically, instead of making investment decisions based on PE multiples calculated using reported net income, as many investors currently do, these decisions can also incorporate an analysis based on PE multiples using forma net income.
For example, consider an investor who values large cap technology stocks (i.e., the fifty stocks in this study) using relative PE multiples based on earnings reported in each company's most recent 10-K. These investors buy stocks that have a low PE multiple relative to the competitive set because they appear to be undervalued and sells companies that have high relative PE multiples because they appear to be overvalued. Moreover, the investor is more likely to invest (long and short) in those stocks with PE values further from the industry average than those near the industry average.
Of the fifty companies in the study, the investor using this decision methodology would exclude from consideration the thirteen companies with an undefined PE multiple based on either reported net income or pro forma net income. Moreover, the investor is likely to exclude from the considered set both Network Appliances and Applied Micro Circuits since their PE multiples based on pro forma net income are extreme outliers to the high end.
This leaves the investor with thirty-five companies to consider. Based on reported PE, eleven companies sell at a premium to the industry average, while twenty-four companies sell at a discount. Using the pro forma PE, ten sell at a premium to the group, while twenty-five sell at a discount. Two companies move from discounts to premiums and three companies move from premiums to discounts when the investor switches from basing his investment decision on the reported PE to the pro forma PE.
In many cases the premium widens relative to the rest of the industry. For example, Rational Software's premium widens from 1.5 times the industry average to more than 4.69 times the average. Clearly, this kind of analysis can be very valuable to the investor using relative valuation to make buy, sell, and hold decisions.
So what does all this mean to the individual investor? Perhaps, it signals a need to stay away from those firms that switch from a premium to a discount or vice versa because it is "unclear", based on these two multiples, whether the equities are under-or over-valued.
Alternatively, an investor who believes that pro forma data are more accurate might take advantage of these opportunities to invest in equities that other investors who base their decisions on PE multiples would have a contrary opinion on. Finally, an investor might consider a company like Rational Software to be a clear short opportunity, as he believes it is selling at a much larger premium than the investor who bases his decision on reported data.
Implications for the Financial Accounting Regulators
This study also has important implications for financial accounting regulators. These regulators should take notice of the significant differences in income between reported and pro forma values. This recognition should push them to implement rules forcing companies to disclose more transparent information with regards to option-based compensation expenses.
In particular, regulators should require companies to report this option-based information not only as part of the footnotes in their year-end 10-K's, but also throughout the year as companies report their unaudited quarterly earnings. Moreover, regulators should reconsider whether companies should be required to incorporate these expenses in their reported income figures, not just in the financial statement's footnotes.
Conclusion
This analysis makes clear that the impact of recording option-based compensation as a compensation expense is indeed significant. Income statement accounts such as net income, diluted EPS and operating income exhibit a difference of more than 15%. The expense recognition approach also has a dramatic impact on historical growth rates.
As such, investors should consider these values when making investment decisions.
Looking at the simple example of the PE multiple, it is easy to see the strong influence on investment decisions that incorporating pro forma based multiple analysis can have. The study also has implications for the financial accounting regulators who should consider revising the disclosure guidelines with respect to option-based compensation to make this information more transparent. (1) Calculated using an estimated tax rate of 40%.
